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I. Introduction
A. Objectives and Overview
The objective of the following study is to evaluate rural deposit
mobilization programmes in Sri Lanka, to identify major bottle-
necks in the national savings system, and to provide recommenda-
tions for improving rural (financial) savings mobilization for
financing rural development.
Major trends in aggregate and financial savings of the economy of
Sri Lanka are given in the following section of the Introduction.
Chapter II reviews the incentive system and institutional frame-
work for (rural) deposit mobilization by focusing on interest
rate policies, access to banking facilities, and the appropriate-
ness of savings instruments. Rural financial savings by type of
financial institution are examined in Chapter III. The scattered
empirical evidence of the performance of informal savings (and
credit) activities is elaborated in Chapter IV. In Chapter V,
reform proposals for mobilizing rural savings for rural develop-
ment are provided, based on an evaluation of major bottlenecks in
savings mobilization (and credit supply) in rural areas. The
discussion focuses on the preferential status of the National
Savings Bank, the insufficient link between savings and lending
activities, the problem of savings outflows from rural areas and
policy options towards the informal (financial) sector.
B. Trends in Aggregate and Financial Savings
Domestic savings as a percentage of GDP have fluctuated in Sri
Lanka between 14 and 22 per cent in the period 1977-1985 (Table
1). The average savings ratio for this period is higher than that- 2 -
of many other countries in a similar stage of development. How-
ever, when referring to the ambitious investment effort which has
been undertaken in the last ten years, and to the binding con-
straint of receiving foreign (commercial) credit as a consequence
of the debt crisis, the savings performance in the eighties was
rather moderate. The strong variations in the savings to GDP
ratio highlight the dependency of the Sri Lankan economy on the
external sector. The evolution of the marginal propensity to save
has more or less followed trends in the terms of trade (Table 1).
In general, a change in the terms of trade in favour of Sri Lanka
has tended to raise the savings to GDP ratio, and vice versa .
2
Financial savings have grown between 1975 and 1985 every year,
except for 1981 and 1985; the average rate of growth for this
period was 15 per cent, which is substantially in excess of (no-
minal) GDP growth (Table 1). The year-to-year fluctuations in
financial savings can largely be explained by changes in real and
nominal interest rates, and by net private capital inflows and
transfers, particularly foreign remittances. The interest rate
sensitivity is especially valid for changes in the holdings of
money and quasi- money, while providence and life insurance funds
have shown a more stable tendency. The influence of shifts in net
private capital inflows and transfers from abroad points to the
importance of the openness of the economy, and the relatively
large Sri Lankan labour force abroad to any strategy of savings
mobilization in the country.
The performance of financial savings was sustained by the size,
extensive geographical coverage, and institutional sophistication
of the financial system. The geographical coverage of deposit-
taking institutions, including post offices and rural banks, is
One explanation for this behaviour could be that disposable
income rises and falls with changes in the terms of trade.
2
Defined as the change in broad money (money plus quasi-money)
and other liabilities of banks and non-banks to the private
sector.- 3 -
Table 1 - Trends in Aggregate and Financial Savings and other Macro-Economic







































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1986, Colombo 1987, IMF esti-
mates; own calculations.- 4 -
extensive. Maturities of bank deposits amount up to 12-month time
deposits. A broad range of instruments, including certificates of
deposits and debentures has evolved, while equity financing has
remained relatively unimportant .
While the commercial banks are by far the largest holders of
financial savings, their share of total financial savings has
been steadily eroded from 57 per cent of total financial savings
in 1978 to 34 per cent in 1985 (see Table 2). The second most
important holder of financial savings is the Employee Fund, whose
share has increased from 17 per cent in 1978 to 27 per cent in
1985 . The National Savings Bank (NSB) is the most important
single-deposit institution keeping a share of 16 per cent in
total savings in 1985, which was also the average share of finan-
cial savings in the period 1978-85, although this share has fluc-
tuated between 8 per cent (1981) and 22 per cent (1982) . From
the remaining financial institutions (the Foreign Currency Bank
Units, insurance companies and finance companies), only the fi-
nance companies have increased their share of financial savings,
while the behaviour of the other institutions has fluctuated
considerably. The co-operative sector accounted for the balance
with less than one per cent. In this category, the share of (Co-
operative) Rural Banks is by far the most important, while the
contribution of co-operative credit societies to the total volume
of financial savings is negligible.
At least there are no data that would permit an assessment of
the performance of equities as a form of financial savings.
2
This increase is explained, in part, by the gradual integration
of an increasing percentage of the work force into the Employee
Fund.
The sudden gain in market share in 1982 is explained by a re-
duction by commercial banks of their minimum rates on 12-month
fixed deposits from 20% to 15%, while the corresponding rate of
the NSB remained at 20%.- 5 -
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actuarial services, plus members' balances.
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Source: Data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; own calculations.— 6 —
II. Incentive System and Institutional Framework for (Rural)
Deposit Mobilization
A. Interest Rate Policies
Available data seem to indicate that in Sri Lanka, as in many
other Asian countries (see Corsepius, Fischer, 1986), it is easi-
er to find supporting evidence showing a link between interest
rates and (the level and composition of) financial savings than
between interest rates and total domestic savings . Real interest
rates on savings and fixed-term deposits, estimated as nominal
rates minus inflation, varied considerably between 1970 and 1986
(Table 3), which was mainly the result of volatile inflation
rates and an inflexible adjustment of nominal interest rates.
While the real (minimum) interest rate for savings accounts has
been negative since 1978 (with the exception of 1985), fixed-term
deposits tended to yield higher returns in real terms. Although
interest rate policies have been more flexible since 1977 than in
earlier years, especially interest rates for savings accounts
have proved to be quite rigid (for example, the minimum rate was
kept constant at the 10% level throughout the period 1980-85).
Beyond that, there seems to be no economic rationale for the
large differential between minimum and maximum rates for the
different types of deposits.
The prevailing range of interest rates on the deposit-taking
institutions has largely been influenced by the authorities, i.e.
through the Bank and Treasury bill rates set by the Central Bank,
as well as through interest rates applied by the National Savings
Bank (NSB). NSB's deposit rates are insulated from market forces
as the government covers the difference between its costs to
mobilize funds and the yield on the asset, which are mainly inve-
sted in government securities. The partial tax-exemption status
of interest on NSB deposits introduced an additional competitive
Besides the direct impact on the real return of domestic sav-
ings, interest rate movements also appear to have had an effect
on net private capital inflows and transfers, which in turn
have affected private savings.- 7 -
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Source: Data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; IBF estimates; own calculations.- 8 -
edge for this institution. The slow response of NSB to market
trends created not only substantial financial transfers to and
from other institutions, but also resulted in market instability
of monetary conditions as the money multipler is likely to vary,
depending on which institutions are gaining resources and which
are losing them. This is the case because reserve requirements
(at present 16 per cent for demand and 8 per cent for time and
savings deposits) only apply to commercial banks. Since reserve
requirements can only be met in the form of non-interest-bearing
deposits in the Central Bank, this implies an additional transfer
of resources to the Central Bank that increases the cost of in-
termediation.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned shortcomings, the liberali-
zation policies initiated in 1977 have freed up interest rates
and resulted in a trend towards positive real rates of interest
on savings deposits. This was an important stimulus for financial
savings to increase. However, a serious distortion still exists
on lending rates for agricultural credit, which continued to
reveal negative interest rates in real terms in the last ten
years (Table Al), as a consequence of the subsidies involved in
various refinance schemes from the Central Bank. This reliance on
refinanced funds has undoubtedly hindered the development of
self-sustaining and viable rural financial institutions and mar-
kets in Sri Lanka.
B. Access to Banking Facilities
The access to banking facilities in rural areas has improved
substantially in the last 15 years (Table 4) . The number of
branches of commercial banks operating in rural areas increased
from 122 (1970) to 571 (1986). This expansion was strengthened
mainly through the People's Bank and the Bank of Ceylon, both
Rural areas are for the present purpose defined somewhat
crudely as the entire country, except the city of Colombo and
the suburbs.- 9 -
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Source: Data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; Silva (no date, Tables 2.1. and 2.2.); oun calculations.- 10 -
State-owned. Over the same period, the number of (co-operative)
rural banks - established by the People's Bank in 1961 and ma-
naged by multipurpose co-operative societies - increased from 90
to 924. In addition to these two categories of institutions there
are in Sri Lanka a fairly large number of credit co-operatives,
some of which enjoy a limited liability status .
When both commercial banks and rural banks are taken together,
the number of population per office was about 8,600 in 1982
(against 5,000 in the city of Colombo, or 1,000, if private fi-
nance companies are added). If compared internationally, the
institutional penetration of rural areas is well above the aver-
age of countries of a similar stage of development (Fischer et
al., 1986, Table 16).
However, these averages might be somewhat distorted, since most
of the "rural" branches are concentrated in semi-urban areas and
larger villages. Nevertheless, there seems to be no need for
expanding the network of branches in face of the weak intermedia-
tion performance of rural financial institutions in the last few
years.
C. Appropriateness of Savings Instruments
There is a wide range of savings instruments offered by financial
2
institutions in Sri Lanka . However, most of the voluntary and
non-contractual financial savings consist of savings and time
deposits (Table 5). Although other types of deposits, such as
savings certificates and premium savings bonds, have only played
a minor role, banks and savings institutions have also strongly
competed among themselves to offer new, attractive savings in-
struments with additional or fringe benefits. Both state sector
banks have offered several contractual forms of savings, aimed at
These primary societies are based on the German Raiffeisen
model and may therefore be considered as genuine co-operatives.
2
For recent trends in the savings deposits markets see Weera-
singhe (1987).- 11 -




































































aDefined as change in broad money (money plus, quasi-money), plus change in
actuarial services, plus members' balances. - Inclusive import deposits and
GIS suspense account with Commercial Banks and savings certificates, premium
savings bonds, pension scheme and interest due on deposits with National
Savings Bank. -
 CIncludes balances and funds of Employees Provident Fund,
Employees Trust Fund, and Life Insurance Fund.
Source: Data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; own calculations.- 12 -
persuading depositors to invest in long-term deposits for periods
of 15 to 20 years. The Pension Scheme is one such scheme which
seeks to induce depositors to invest small sums of money over a
specified period of time in the hope of receiving a stream of
benefits upon reaching the age of retirement. Another scheme
which both banks have marketed with good success is the Minors
Endowment Scheme. Under this scheme parents were encouraged to
invest a lump sum which would remain with the bank until the
child reaches 21 years of age, at which time the deposit would be
paid together with accumulated interest. The People's Bank and
the National Savings Bank have experimented with variants of the
premium scheme, under which cash prices are offered to winners.
Banks have also been allowed by the government to offer Sri Lan-
kans working abroad a new facility - Non-Resident Foreign Cur-
rency Account - in which remittances can be held in foreign cur-
rency earning interest in foreign currency for a period of ten
years, during which period the depositor enjoys the right to use
these funds without being subject to exchange controls.
Transaction costs related to opening new accounts and making
deposits and withdrawals can be assessed to be relatively low,
even for small savers. For example, the minimum amount required
for the opening of a savings account is as low as Rs 5-10, de-
pending on the type of financial institution. At the same time,
banks have attempted to simplify their procedures related to
opening and withdrawal of accounts, started the practice of auto-
matic removal upon maturity, and of paying monthly, quarterly, or
half-yearly interests.- 13 -
III. (Rural) Financial Savings by Type of Institution
A. Commercial Banks and Financial Companies
At present there are 22 foreign banks and four indigenous banks
operating in Sri Lanka. The two state banks, namely the People's
Bank and the Bank of Ceylon, account for approximately 90 per
cent of the banking business of the indigenous banks, whilst the
two small private banks (Hatton National Bank and the Commercial
Bank) together account for approximately 10 per cent of banking
activities of the indigenous banks. Commercial banks have func-
tioned as the most important vehicles for deposit mobilization,
accounting for 37 per cent of total financial savings in 1985
(Table 2). The predominance of the commercial banking sector in
deposit mobilization is understandable, as the banks, through
their wide network of branches all over the country, provide
access to the saver as a convenient and safe outlet for savings.
An additional factor may be that the foreign remittances, espe-
cially from the Middle East countries, which have become a signi-
ficant source of savings and which, because remittances come
through commercial banks, tend to remain within the commercial
banking sector. The finance companies, which mainly operate in
Colombo and a few provincial towns, could increase their relative
shares in the last few years substantially (1984: 8.3 per cent).
The progress of rural savings mobilization cannot be traced easi-
ly, as disaggregate data for the commercial banking sector, show-
ing the volume of deposits mobilized in rural areas, are not
available. However, both the Bank of Ceylon and the People's Bank
(together with the affiliated Rural Banks - see section C.I. -)
have a widespread network of branches in rural areas, and ob-
viously have been quite successful in mobilizing rural deposits
(Fernando, 1986a), while private domestic banks and finance com-
panies have played a minor role, due to the concentration of
their branches in Colombo . Given the poor lending performance of
Worthmentioning is, however, a mobile bank savings scheme ini-
tiated as a pilot project by the Hattan National Bank, which
was designed to tap the savings of tea plantation workers, a
segment of the Sri Lankan population hitherto neglected by the
banking sector as being to poor to save. For an examination of
this experience see Silva, Gnanasekeram, 1985.Bibliothek des Instituts
fur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
- 14 -
commercial banks in rural areas, one can safely assume that the
vast majority of savings mobilized in rural areas has been
diverted out of the rural economy to urban and export-oriented
investment.
B. National Savings Bank
The National Savings Bank (NSB), founded in 1972, is a specia-
lized savings institution having absorbed, since its foundation
in 1972, the functions of the Post Office Savings. It has been
very successful in attracting savings in urban and rural areas
due to its large numbers of service outlets (number of branches,
post office and sub-post offices in 1986: 60, 478 and 3,220 re-
spectively) , its offering slightly better interest rates than
commercial banks, which usually follow the NSB in order to main-
tain market share, and a wide range of savings instruments . Up
to 1985, the NSB also enjoyed a special tax concession for depo-
2
sitors not available from the commercial banks . In 1986, the NSB
could substantially increase its market share in the banking
sector from 28 per cent (1985) to 47 per cent (Central Bank of
Sri Lanka, 1987, Table 47). despite a reduction of interest rates
on deposits and the introduction of a withholding tax on interest
rate;s earned on deposits.
Between 1975 and 1986, there was a clear trend of increasing
importance of fixed deposits (from 13.9 per cent to 68.7 per cent
of total balances), whereas the percentage share of ordinary
savings accounts on total deposits declined from 78.6 per cent to
29.1 per cent in the same period, reflecting mainly the change of
Including pension schemes, endowment schemes and premium sav-
ings bonds. Among the additional measures taken to mobilise
savings are mobile banking services, authorised savings repre-
sentatives, and special savings schemes for the plantation
sector (National Savings Bank, 1986, pp. 2-3).
2
Interest earnings up to Rs 2,000 per person (maximum four per-
sons per family), pjr one-third of all interest income, which-
ever is greater, is exempt from income tax.- 15 -
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Source: Data provided by National Savings Bank; own calculations.- 16 -
interest rate structure in favour of fixed deposits (Table 6).
Savings certificates and other savings schemes only played a
minor role. The average account of deposits increased from Rs 246
(1975) to Rs 1,803 (1986). At the end of 1983, most of the sav-
ings accounts were with deposits below Rs 10,000 (Table A2).
Since the bulk of deposits (over 90 per cent) is greatly invested
in government securities and treasury bills, the funds mobilized
in rural areas are not lent there but designed to finance govern-
ment budgetary requirements.
C. Co-operative Movement
1. (Co-operative) Rural Banks
In 1964, some of the larger, more successful Milti-Purpose Coope-
rative Societies (MPCSs) formed - with the assistance of the
People's Bank - a self-administered savings and loan facility .
Fostered by the Co-operative Department, these institutions ex-
panded very rapidly, covering 283 Rural Banks with 646 branches
in 1986 (Table 7). At the same time, deposit mobilization in
rural areas increased from Rs 16.9 million (1979) to Rs 1,259.1
million (1986) (Table 8).
Since Rural Banks are not recognized as "banks" by the Central
Bank and the Monetary Law, they are forbidden from accepting
demand deposits or operating checking accounts. They are also
exempted from legal reserve requirements, which gives them a com-
petitive edge on commercial banks. All Rural Banks are required
to make a monthly deposit to a Deposit Guarantee Fund administer-
ed by the People's Bank. The amount is 0.1 per cent (per month)
of the total deposits in fixed and savings accounts.
Assistance was provided by the People's Bank in granting loans
and in providing training and technical assistance through a
specially trained advisor attached to each Rural Bank. For
details see Gunasekara (1986) . The evolution of Rural Banks in
Sri Lanka is analysed by People's Bank (1983).- 17 -
Table 7 - Number of Branches, Deposits Mobilized and Lending Operations of (Co-





























































































Source: Data provided by People's Bank; own calculations.





















































































Source: Data provided by People's Bank; own calculations.- 18 -
The main strength of Rural Banks seems to be savings mobiliza-
tion. Statistically, one out of eight inhabitant of Sri Lanka had
a savings account with a Rural Bank in 1986. Although interest
rates paid on ordinary savings and deposits are slightly lower
than those of commercial banks, the accessibility of the Rural
Banks has obviously more than compensated for this relative dis-
advantage. The bulk of deposits mobilized from members and non-
members are savings deposits; the number of savings accounts
nearly doubled between 1980 and 1986 up to two million. Average
savings per account holder were Rs 532 in 1986, indicating that
most of the funds come from middle-income savings units. Fixed-
term deposits accounted for less than 15 per cent of total depo-
sits, and the much higher average amount per account holder
(1986: Rs 7,156) demonstrates that these funds stem from the
wealthier part of the rural population.
The advances of Rural Banks are loans to co-operative societies
and pawning. For loans up to Rs 5,000, two guarantors are usually
accepted as security, while larger loans require collatoral (for
example, land titles). Loans are also available against 90 per
cent of fixed and savings balances, although lending based on
this form of security seems to be rather an exception. The domi-
nant (and more profitable) lending business is pawnbroking (Table
8), whereby members and non-members can obtain loans against
pawned jewellery. Lending activities have risen only moderately
over the last few years, and could not be expanded in line with
the extension of bank branches and savings accounts. Since 1980,
the share of total advances to total deposits was below 60 per
cent. Excess funds are either deposited with the People's Bank
or, more recently, with the National Savings Bank. Because of the
poor lending performance of the People's Bank in rural areas (and
the fact that most of the deposits of the NSB are used to finance
government expenditure), the primary beneficiaries of RB's mobi-
lized deposits are import and export financing, industry and
trade activities, typically located in urban areas.- 19 -
2. Thrift and Credit Co-operative Societies (TCCSs)
Since 1979, the Department of Co-operative Development has been
making efforts to revive TCCSs, which seemed to be promising
institutions for . rural credit and savings development in Sri
Lanka. The most important reform elements introduced since 1979
are: the conversion of some successfully-run societies into co-
operative banks; the granting of limited liability status to
these societies (which gives them more autonomy in deciding po-
licies pertaining to lending and deposit mobilization); mainten-
ance of an office at a specific address with regular office hours
for acceptance of deposits and making payments; the appointment
of a paid, full-time manager to carry out office functions and
maintain account books; and finally, the establishment of Di-
strict Unions of TCCSs to function as coordinating agencies.
Table 9 shows that there have been 1,700 TCCSs with around
229,000 members in 1983, spread throughout the country. Growth in
deposits has been significant between 1976 and 1981, but has
slowed down in the following years.
The organizational principle of these societies is as follows:
Either the villagers themselves or an outside organizer brings
together a group of people who wish to make savings deposits,
which will form a lending base. While previously self-sufficiency
of these societies was implicit since village savings were the
only funds which could be lent, more recently their federation
and some District Unions have changed their original rationale
substantially. This was mainly due to the injection of external
funds from Government and foreign donors at subsidized rates,
which eroded financial discipline and the formerly attached im-
portance to the volume of savings in determining the extent of
borrowings that a member could seek from a society.
While all TCCSs offer a standard savings account, some of them
also offer fixed deposits, childrens' accounts, and/or group
accounts. Regular monthly deposits are urged on members and non-
members alike. Typically, the TCCSs pay interests on savings with- 20 -
Table 9 - Characteristics of the Thrift and Credit Co-operative


















































Source: Data provided by the Department of Co-operative Develop-
ment; own calculations.
a rate of one to two percentage points higher than those offered
by the banks, depending on the type of account. Unless arrange-
ments have been made to deposit excess cash in a TCCS's District
Bank, the societies maintain an account with a commercial bank.
The loans committee accepts applications from potential borrowers
who, unlike depositors, must be shareholders. Decisions on loans
and subsequent supervision are discussed in the general meetings
which are held monthly. Loan sizes are generally small, depending
on the TCCS's capital fund, demand for loans, and intended end-
use. In newer societies, or those with low capital funds, loans
of Rs 500-1000 are common, while established TCCSs make loans of- 21 -
up to Rs 5,000 and more. Interest rates for most loans of the
TCCS's own funds have been around 14-16% in 1986, and hence well
above the concessional loan rates of 6% and 9% of the Million
Houses Programme and the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme,
credit programmes which have tried to be channelled through the
TCCSs.
A case study of three TCCSs in Kegalle District provides an in-
teresting insight with regard to the savings behaviour of TCCS
members (Attanayake, 1985). As one would expect, the average
amount of savings deposited is closely related to income, al-
though even those receiving food stamps had savings with the
TCCSs. Higher interest rates have in general attracted more term
deposits (fixed deposits and investment savings), and have had an
especially significant bearing on the volume of non-member depo-
sits. Even more interesting are the factors which proved to be
particularly relevant for savings mobilization by TCCSs. The most
important factor that motivated the villagers in joining the so-
ciety and to save with it was the easy access to credit (espe-
cially in cases of emergency). Intimate knowledge of each other,
lack of security conditions, and the simple method of processing
loan applications have enabled TCCSs to perform their credit
functions to the satisfaction of the members. A further important
factor was seen in the close proximity of the TCCSs and the con-
venience for the customers, which has improved in the case of
conversion of the TCCS into a co-operative bank.
D. Regional Rural Development Banks
In 1985, the Central Bank was mandated to form Regional Rural
Development Banks (RRDBs) to provide credit in areas and for
target groups which hitherto had not been served by banking faci-
lities. Other objectives include the provision of services for
the development of agriculture, cottage and small-scale industry,
fishing industry, commerce, and other development activities in- 22 -
rural areas. Originally funded with 100 per cent equity from the
Central Bank, the emphasis of the RRDBs was by design on lending.
Nevertheless, four of the six already founded banks (with 15
branches altogether) showed a strong deposit mobilization per-
formance (Rs 8.2 million as at 21 March 1986), paying 10% inter-
ests for savings and 12% for fixed deposits. However, one has to
assume that most of these savings are rather coming from other
financial institutions than from the target type of clientele. At
least from the point of view of deposit mobilization one has to
question these newly created financial institutions, given the
abundance of financial institutions already existing in rural
areas.
E. Savings Schemes in Government-Supported Projects
In the last few years, various government-supported projects and
programmes for the agricultural sector have been implemented,
which also include the operation of small savings schemes. For
example, the promotion of savings groups have been tried within
Farmers' Associations and Associations of Water Users . The tech-
nique normally adopted is to tie the grant of credit to the mak-
ing of a savings deposit. To link up savings and credit is also
one of the objectives of a pilot project by the government in the
Kalutara District of Sri Lanka which intends to create rotating
savings associations among the estate worker population (Silva,
1985). In another pilot project - the People's Participation
Programme - regularly savings are stimulated within groups of
small farmers to be used for income generating activities and
social purposes (Abrew, 1987). The present government also plans
to introduce an ambitious pension and social security benefit
scheme for farmers which is aimed at - among other objectives
fostering saving habits (Liyanage, 1987). An assessment of the
achievements of these efforts to mobilize rural savings is not
possible due to the lack of statistical documentation.
For a description of the intended savings schemes in these
projects see Hewavitharana (1987a, pp. 10-11).- 23 -
IV. Hoarding and Informal Savings (and Credit) Activities in
Rural Areas
A. Hoarding
No quantitative estimates are available to gain a more concrete
idea of the magnitude of hoarding in the Sri Lankan economy.
However, the existing evidence suggests that hoarding is a wide-
spread phenomenon, especially in rural areas. Hoarding takes
place mainly in the form of investments in gold jewellery. This
preference is less due to an insufficient supply of formal sav-
ings opportunities in rural areas, but rests mainly on the con-
vertibility of gold into cash at short notice in the rural mar-
kets, serving in the meantime as an inflation hedge. Gold jewel-
lery serves also as an excellent security for raising loans or
pawning in the rural financial markets (Bouman, Houtman, 1987).
This indicates that the availability of safe and attractive sav-
ings instruments alone is not sufficient to reduce the preference
for hoarding gold. Only if holdings of savings accounts will also
imply easier access to credit it can be expected that this form
of investment will be reduced.
B. Informal Savings Arrangements
There is a variety of informal group arrangements for savings in
Sri Lanka . A few of them save in commodity form, while some save
for a specific purpose, such as pilgrimages. Others, such as
death-aid societies, sometimes collect regular contributions and
lend idle funds. Finally, arrangements are made through an orga-
nizer to whom funds are regularly given for a period of safe-
keeping, to be returned at the end of the period. A typical and
more widespread example for informal savings arrangements is the
Sarvodaya Shramadara Movement (SSM). The SSM is a widely distri-
For a more detailed description and analysis of informal sav-
ings and credit arrangements in Sri Lanka see Bouman (1984).- 24 -
buted network of childrens' savings accounts, existing since
1980. This scheme is now operating in more than 2,000 villages,
with about 126,000 accounts, and has mobilized up to 1987 around
Rs 6 million (Bellows, 1987, pp. 74-78). Funds are collected by
unpaid pre-school teachers, deposited at Sarvodaya district cen-
tres, and finally invested in fixed deposits at the National
Savings Bank with an interest rate of 13%. The children are re-
paid 11%, the difference being used to meet its expenses. Al-
though there are plans to expand savings and credit operations to
meet also adults by using the extensive Sarvodaya infrastructure,
the SSM programme is still strongly savings-based, and funds are
not subjected to be re-invested in the rural sector.
Savings and credit activities are most common in Cheetu-Funds,
the Sri Lankan-type of rotating savings and credit association.
Finally, there are individual money lenders who are concentrated
more on the lending side of informal financial markets. Both the
economic performance of Cheetu-Funds and the range of non-insti-
tutional lending are analyzed in the subsequent sections.
C. Cheetu-Funds
The most popular type of informal financial institution in Sri
Lanka is Cheetu , a rotating savings and credit association,
similar to those found under different names in all part of the
world. The basic formula is that a group of participants makes
regular (small) contributions to a fund, which is given to each
2 member in turn . After twelve months each player has had a turn,
and the Cheetu will disband or start a new cycle. Cheetu rules,
which are decided at the first meeting, vary from place to place,
and may differ with regard to the number of players, length of
At village level various Cheetu systems can be found; for ex-
ample, Parum Cheetu, Sangangu Cheetu, Palee Petti and Athmoru.
2
For a comprehensive discussion of the nature characteristics,
and dynamics of the Cheetu System in Sri Lanka see Fernando
(1986b).- 25 -
interval, amount of contribution, and the way to determine rota-
tion (order of enlistment, negotiation, lottery or auction).
The Cheetu's combine savings with lending. Members appreciate the
discipline of contractual group savings by which they gradually
accumulate a lump sum on small contributions. The attraction is
that most participants have access to this sum at an earlier date
than when saving individually. A Cheetu involves little admini-
stration. Recipients are seldom requested to provide collateral,
guarantors, or other forms of security. The successful organizer
is usually a business person with a solid financial reputation,
who has himself a professional interest in savings schemes be-
cause of the opportunity these schemes offer for acquiring work-
ing capital. To the saver, the attractive part of these arrange-
ments is that savings deposits create a line of credit in times
of need. The saver-borrower values especially the quick accessi-
bility and flexibility of these savings schemes.
D. Non-Institutional Credit
According to available data, the informal sector has been, and
probably still is, a dominant source of credit to the rural eco-
nomy. This is striking after four decades of concessional credit
schemes for the agricultural sector under which institutional
credit is granted at highly subsidised rates of interest . Al-
though the informal sources have somewhat declined in importance
- for the 1980s they were estimated to be about 50-60 per cent of
2
total borrowings in the rural sector - they still continue to
dominate the rural credit market in areas where the institutional
lenders are absent or ineffective, and where the access to formal
credit is extremely poor.
For an overview of past trends and present policies in insti-
tutional lending to the rural sector in Sri Lanka see Silva
(1987) .
o
See Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1984) and Department of Census
and Statistics (1986).- 26 -
The demand for non-institutional credit for agricultural purposes
arises mainly from the poor farmer (operators of mini and small
holdings, marginal farmers) which lack acceptable collaterals and
access to institutional sources. However, there are also those
farmers who have been disqualified for institutional loans under
the different concessional credit schemes due to their defaults.
Finally, farmers who have principally access to formal financial
institutions may resort to the non-institutional section because
of the bothersome procedures, the hidden costs and other incon-
veniences involved in formal loan transactions. There might also
be the fear of having to face legal proceedings in case of de-
fault. On the other side farmers may prefer non-institutional
sources to formal sources because they are more convenient, rea-
dily accessible, procedures are simple, formal collateral not
required, lending conditions and repayment terms are flexible,
credit not limited to crop production but available for consump-
tion and emergency needs as well . Consumption credit require-
ments of the poorer classes originate in numerous "emergencies"
associated with crop failures, natural disasters, illness, un-
foreseen events, lump sum expenditures as in education and cere-
monies, and unfavourable trends in product markets. This area of
credit is traditionally not met sufficiently by institutional
sources.
There exist numerous types of suppliers with widely different
types of objectives in the informal credit market, including
friends and relatives, landlords, village boutique keeper, trader
cum money lender, produce collectors, commission agents, profes-
2
sional and semi-professional money lenders . The characteristics
of the different non-institutional lenders and their operational
modes are strongly related to the size of farms, their producti-
vity levels, frequency patterns of cropping, irrigation condi-
tions, extent of diversification and sectoral composition of the
Estimated to be about 50 per cent of all loans of the non-in-
stitutional section to farmers.
2
For a description of the profile and operational modes of these
different types of non-institutional lenders see Hewavitharana
(1987b, pp. 6-11).- 27 -
rural economy, socio-cultural features and other aspects of rural
agriculture and of rural society.
The most important features of informal sector loans are low
transaction costs (on both the lending and borrowing side) due to
low overhead costs, simple procedures, quick disbursement, easy
accessibility, flexible methods, and intimate local knowledge as
well as access to credit without (real) collateral requirements.
An estimate of the interest rate structure of informal credit
market indicates that, contrary to the popular belief, the aver-
age interest rate (30-40% per annum) has not been exorbitantly
high (Fernando, 1987). A significant proportion of the volume of
loans have been transacted at rates which are not out of line
with the rates prevailing in the formal sector if adjusted by the
difference of transaction costs minus subsidies. The large share
of interest free loans extended by friends and relatives is an
indication of the importance of the complex social relationships
in the informal rural credit market. In the case of professional
money lenders opportunity cost and risk premium seem to be much
more significant in explaining the interest rates charged than
administrative costs and monopoly power.
Disappointment with institutional credit schemes for the agricul-
tural sector and the appreciation of the relative advantages of
non-institutional lenders which obviously are better adapted to
lending in a rural community have led to the proposal to incorpo-
rate non-institutional credit into the institutional credit net-
work. Measures proposed to this end are for the institutions to
appoint loan agents among non-institutional lenders, provide them
capital or refinance facilities and leave them with full freedom
to determine eligibility and to recover loans (Ministry of Fi-
nance and Planning (1984). However, there is no exposition so far
of the mechanisms and the ways in which such measures would help
to solve the rural credit problem in Sri Lanka.- 28 -
V. Reform Proposals for Mobilizing Savings for Rural Develop-
ment
Whether the potential for mobilizing rural savings in Sri Lanka
is exhausted or not can only be judged by an assessment of the
savings capacity of the rural population. Although statistically
not documented, there are several indications that savings in
jewellery, foodstuffs, materials and other inflation hedges is
still a widespread phenomenon, especially with the poorer part of
the rural population. This indicates that, despite the progress
made in mobilizing rural deposits, there is still room for
strengthened efforts by pursuing more flexible interest rate
policies and enforcing competition among the different financial
institutions. However given the prevailing excess funds within
the financial sector on the one hand and the insufficient supply
of agricultural credit on the other, additional savings mobiliz-
ing institutions may not be seen as a priority issue. Neverthe-
less, several distortions with respect to savings mobilization
exist in the rural financial market which may also have negative-
ly influenced the lending performance in rural areas. This will
be discussed in the following sections.
A. The Preferential Status of the National Savings Bank
A serious distortion concerned with deposit mobilization through
the Sri Lankan financial system is the preferential market posi-
tion of the National Savings Bank. The inflexibility of interest
rates on deposits is mainly the result of the leading role of the
National Savings Bank, whose fixed deposit rates are frequently
set independent from market forces. It competes with commercial
banks for deposits at whatever rate is necessary to keep its
market share (regardless of cost considerations) which is easily
achieved due to its widespread deposit-collecting agencies. The
NSB has had especially no incentive to reduce its deposit rates
to levels consistent with the yield on its assets (long-term
government securities at a fixed yield), because the resulting- 29 -
negative differential (or loss) has been covered through trans-
fers from the Government. A removal of these subsidies would
oblige the authorities to adjust the yield on long-term govern-
ment securities, in line with other market rates, considering the
risk and maturity. Another action for increasing the yield of
NSB's assets would be to diversify a part of its portfolio into
assets with higher yields than the government securities . This
movement could include the initiative of lending secured by depo-
sits at rates comparable to overdraft facilities in commercial
banks. However, this can only be realized as a longer-term stra-
tegy, since NSB's present capacity to embark on direct lending
seems to be extremely limited. Nevertheless, such a diversifica-
tion away from government securities would lead to placing upward
pressures on government borrowing rates.
A further issue which has to be questioned in relation to NSB's
preferential status is whether it needs the tax incentive as a
compensation for not being able to accept interest-free demand
deposits, to extend high-yielding overdrafts against its depo-
sits, and to conduct other lucrative banking business; in this
context one has to bear in mind that NSB is exempt from reserve
requirements, has a risk-free asset portfolio, has not been forc-
ed to produce profits, and would be expected to have lower ope-
rating costs than banks. The National Savings Bank has been used
by the Government to collect savings and also to finance the
government deficit. To achieve this goal, tax incentives and
subsidies have been provided for this institution. However, one
has to ask whether the Government could not raise equal or larger
amounts at lower costs by selling some type of government securi-
ties directly to the public at market-oriented of interest rates?
Although this would lead to higher government interest payments,
the government deficit would not necessarily increase due to the
savings from the removal of the subsidy and additional income tax
receipts.
Although since 1984 NSB has been authorized to invest up to 40
per cent of its portfolio in such higher-yielding assets, it
has been slow to do so.- 30 -
B. The Insufficient Link between Savings and Lending Activities
A severe bottleneck in the Sri Lankan financial system is the
weak link between savings and credit activities, which is espe-
cially the case within rural financial institutions. Several fac-
tors have contributed to this weak link. Firstly, this is partly
the outcome of the existence of specialized savings and credit
institutions like the National Savings Bank and the National
Development Bank. Secondly, this failure might be seen as a re-
sult of the comprehensive concessional loan schemes and re-fi-
nancing facilities for the agricultural sector, which reduce the
effort of financial institutions to mobilize savings for lending
in rural areas. These negative side-effects of subsidized loan
schemes particularly undermine the intermediation process of
those financial institutions, like Rural Banks and Thrift and
Cooperative Credit Societies, which would be most capable of
enforcing the savings/credit link due to their relative closeness
to their clientele. Thirdly, given the below-market level of
interest rates for rural credits, the involved credit rationing
mechanism favours (real) collateral-based lending, and discrimi-
nates the supply of credit for higher risk and higher yield pro-
jects. Interest rates for credit which would allow the coverage
of higher transaction costs in rural lending would not only ease
the access to credit problems for smaller farmers and businessmen
in rural areas, but would also open up the option to accept sav-
ings deposits or the underlying depository behaviour as security
for loans. This process would be further strengthened by measures
to increase the competitive environment for the existing fina-
ncial institutions which at present are operating in rather iso-
lated markets.
C. The Problem of Savings Outflows from Rural Areas
It is a widespread claim in developing countries that savings
mobilized in rural areas are not used locally but transferred to
urban areas, and Sri Lanka is no exception. The limited lending
activities in rural areas may partly be explained by stressing- 31 -
the higher transaction costs for rural lending which cannot be
covered by the existing interest rates. However, it has also to
be recognized that the well functioning of rural financial mar-
kets largely depends on the economic vitality of the farmers and
rural households they serve. Although an in-depth treatment of
the claimed lack of viable projects in Sri Lanka's agricultural
sector is beyond the scope of the present study, it has to be
kept in mind that distorted exchange rates, export duties and
inefficient agricultural markets as well as other government
interventions are favouring, in general, investment projects in
urban areas. If farmers receive relatively low prices for their
products their ability to use financial markets is diminished:
hence they are less willing to borrow, less able to repay loans,
and have less capacity to save. Thus, the problem of rural sav-
ings not being used in rural areas can rather be eliminated by
improving the internal terms-of-trade in favour of the agricul-
tural sector than by re-channelling the occurring savings out-
flows through concessional credit schemes back to rural areas.
D. Policy Options Towards the Informal Financial Sector
Attempts to regulate the informal financial activities by public
authorities have to be judged as critically as proposals to im-
prove the functioning of local savings groups by enforced co-ope-
ration with rural financing institutions , or by transforming
them into formal financial institutions. The reasoning behind
this reservation is that the relative success of the informal and
semi-formal groups critically depends on the fact that they are
far less controlled (or controllable) than organized financial
institutions. A more promising alternative can be seen in dis-
mantling the preferential status of the NSB and re-financing
allowances of the various credit schemes for the agricultural
sector. This could enforce competition among the existing formal
For such a proposal see, for instance, Silva (1983).- 32 -
financial institutions and lead to financial innovations which
would benefit small savers and investors in the rural (and urban)
area.
External assistance for savings mobilization activities in the
informal (financial) sector is seriously confronted with the
problem that - due to the formal procedures needed to channel
foreign aid to the target groups - Government's capacity to con-
trol these activities will increase, thus reducing the informal
character of savings and credit societies, for example. Further-
more, any kind of external support is contradictory to the inter-
nal logic and economic rationale of self-help organizations,
which derive their relative economic advantages against formal
institutions just from their independence from the Government and
other organizations, external donor agencies included.
Multilateral aid organizations have in the past pursued the ap-
proach of providing cheap credit to Sri Lanka for special target
groups within the poorer part of the rural population, which has
been assumed to be unable to save. However, in practice, target
groups - such as small farmers and fishermen - of the informal
sector only very seldom have actually benefited by these credits.
To the extent that the formal sector has been finally the reci-
pient of these aid programmes, there has been an additional dis-
crimination of the production activities in the informal sector.
Paradoxically, informal production was confined to be financed
internally or with credit from informal financial institutions,
at interest rates which have been significantly higher than those
in the organized financial sector.- 33 -
Table Al - Nominal and Real Rates of Interest on Rural Credit
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Source: Data provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka; own cal-
culations .






















































































Source: Data provided by National Savings Bank; own calculations.- 34 -
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